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ABSTRACT
Capital structure is not only the result of the various financial characteristics 
of the firm but is also determined by the decision makers. The study from 
the perspective of the Agency Theory, examines the relationship between 
ownership structure and the capital structure of the Automobile Industry in 
India from 2001 to 2014 by using panel data analysis. Debt Equity Ratio 
represented capital structure and Promoters Shareholding wasused as a 
proxy for ownership structure. The findings of the study after controlling 
for variables like assets turnover ratio, uniqueness and size reveal that 
ownership structure has a significant and positive relationship with capital 
structure showing postulates of the Agency Theory. The findings lend new 
insights to the fact that a majority of the Indian automobile firms which 
are family oriented promote the use of debt to mitigate agency costs unlike 
the popular belief that Indian firms follow the Pecking Order Theory. The 
existence of the Agency Theory signals to the probable investors about the 
managers-shareholders as well as shareholders-debtholders relationship, 
and its impact on company’s debt taking capacity. 
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INTRODUCTION
The capital structure of a firm is made up of equity, retained earnings and 
debt. These three major components somewhere depict the firm ownership 
structure in the sense that equity and retained earnings reflect shareholder’s 
ownership while debt represents the ownership of external agencies. This 
pattern is found both in developing and developed countries. Owing to 
this fact, the financing policy, capital structure and firm ownership are 
all strongly inter linked in explaining how managers, who are the agents 
employed to work for maximizing the returns to the shareholders, modify 
their behavior in acquiring good projects for the company and influence 
the returns in the form of direct remuneration, capital gains or dividends. 
“Capital structure is not only the result of the various financial characteristics 
of the firm; it is also determined by the decision-makers’ choice. Both 
managers and significant outside owners exert a major influence on decision-
making in the firm and, consequently on financing decisions.” (Pindado & 
de La Torre, 2011) The rise of the Modern Corporation, with its separation 
of owners from the management, has created a set of agency problems 
between shareholders & the management and between the debtholders & the 
shareholders that can cause capital structure decisions to deviate from what 
is expected from neoclassical models. Managers may not always work for 
the benefit of the shareholders. Against this backdrop, Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) were among the first authors to give the concept of Agency Theory 
of capital structure. The managers in firms may invest in negative projects 
out of the available free cash flow to gain personal perks. This may result 
in high agency costs to the firms. Debt is one of the important factors that 
alleviates the agency cost problems arising between shareholders and the 
managers as the debtholders will monitor the managerial actions and create 
a soft pressure to perform well to pay the fixed obligations. However higher 
debt may result into financial distress and loss of jobs for the managers. It 
may also elevate the problems between the debtholders and the shareholders 
of the company. Thus, managers may opt for lower debt ratios to avoid 
bankruptcy risks.
Businesses starts as proprietorship, partnership, or closely held limited 
company in India. However, when the business attains economies of scale, 
for growth; the firms need to adopt the Initial Public Offering (IPO) route. 
With this, the first stage of diffusion of ownership starts. Consequently, it 
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then further opts for issue of share capital depending on the requirement 
of funds for capital investment and other factors such as choice of capital 
structure, signalling impact of new issue, etc. The owners of the closely 
held companies taking them to the stage of IPO are known as ‘promoters’ 
in the Indian context. They are considered insiders until they cease to retain 
control over the Board of Directors. The shareholding has been classified 
in Table 1 according to the standard taxonomy of investor’s categories and 
definitions as provided under Clause 35 and 40 A of the listing agreement.
Table 1: Shareholding Classification
Promoters Equity Holding Indian promoters holding
Foreign promoters holding
Persons Acting in concert
Non Promoters holding: Institutions Mutual Funds, Unit Trust of India (UTI)
Banks 
Financial Institutions
Insurance companies
Foreign Institutional investors (FIIs)
Non Promoters  ho ld ing:  Non 
Institutions
Corporate Bodies
Individual (Indian Public)
Others
Source: Ministry of Corporate Affairs, Clause 35 and 40A
The persons or bodies other than the promoters having investment 
in the share capital are ‘non-promoter’ or ‘non-promoter shareholders’. 
(Ganguli, 2009). 
RATIONALE OF SELECTING THE AUTOMOBILE 
INDUSTRY IN INDIA
Recently many Indian firms have faced bankruptcy issues due to the 
over reliance on debt or due to improper capital structure decisions. For 
an emerging economy like India it becomes important for the Indian 
manufacturing firms to have an optimal capital structure. With strong 
backward and forward linkages, the automobile sector has been identified 
as one of the sunrise industries in the manufacturing sector. The automobile 
industry currently contributes 49% of the manufacturing GDP and 7.5% of 
the country’s GDP (Source: SIAM).
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Demographically and economically, India’s automotive industry is 
well poised for growth, servicing both domestic and global markets. The 
companies benefiting most from this evolving landscape would be the ones 
who prepare for the growing importance of green technologies, and who 
remain flexible enough to respond to the twin needs of private light transport 
and mass transport schemes (Source: KPMG, Auto Survey). To cash in on 
these opportunities, companies will have to invest heavily in Technology, 
Research & Development, and Assets, which will further compel the 
companies to raise funds through debt or equity and strategize their capital 
structure to ensure financial benefits. Capital-intensive industries tend to 
have higher debt-to-equity ratios than low-capital industries because capital-
intensive industries are compelled to purchase more property, plants, and 
equipment to operate.
The debt equity ratio (capital structure) of Automobile Industry ranges 
between 30 to 70 % from 2001-2014 and as of 2015 it was 45% (Source: 
CMIE prowess database). 
The findings till now suggest that Indian firms follow the Pecking 
Order Theory (Babu & Jain, 1998), where internal funds are given more 
preference than external funds for fulfilling the capital requirements of the 
firm. But the debt to equity ratio over the period of study clearly shows that 
debt as a choice of fund in the total capital structure is gaining popularity 
amongst these firms. Also, empirical evidence suggest a mix of Pecking 
Order and Trade Of Theories in Indian manufacturing irms (Chadha & 
Sharma, 2015; Jackling & Johl, 2009). If the agency problems are absent, 
capital structure should be expected to be independent from the structure and 
concentration of ownership. The argument is that if the agency problems can 
be attributed to the fact that firms are incorporated, the financial performance 
and capital structure decisions cannot be independent from the ownership 
structure and concentration. 
The capital structure components of the selected sample firms has a 
tilt towards ownership with equity and retained earnings being more than 
60% of the total funds (Source: Prowess Database). Also Indian ownership 
pattern is heavy on the family ownership side (Chakrabarti et al., 2008). 
Against this backdrop, it would be interesting to know if the capital structure 
of automobile firms which are cyclical in nature and capital intensive, can 
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be influenced by the change in the ownership pattern in these firms with 
some traces of the Agency Theory.
LITERATURE REVIEW
Since the inception of the idea of separation of ownership from management 
in companies, the burning issue of agency cost has never settled down 
and even flags high. Various attempts of internal and external structures 
such as laws, ethics corporate governance and ownership dispersion have 
been developed to address this agency problem. The present study found 
a positive relationship with capital structure. Similar results were found 
by Ganguli (2013) in the Indian context. Based on the Agency Theory, 
the findings indicated that the ownership structure does impact capital 
structure but not the vice versa i.e. leverage had a positive relationship with 
concentrated shareholding and had a negative relation with diffuseness of 
shareholding after controlling for profitability, risk, tangibility, growth, 
and size. Gill et al. (2015) investigated the relationship between capital 
and promoters shareholding and predicted that managers may take debt 
to please the shareholders but the risk of bankruptcy is always there and 
concluded that a change in promoter ownership played a significant role 
in reducing debt. Tawiah et al. (2014) found a strong relationship between 
promoter ownership structure and board composition and argued that high 
promoter concentration is a contributing factor for more promoters on the 
board of the companies. Previous research reported that the old companies 
in the Automobile industry are family dominated ownership in the form of 
promoters (Tawiah et al., 2014). Kalashree and Rajashekar (2014) argued 
that the shareholding is concentrated in the hands of the promoters and this 
has low to moderate relationship with size of the board. Reddy and Locke 
(2013) observe that an increase in independent directors, board member 
experience, size of company, borrowing from members rather than banks; 
reduces agency costs and increases profitability in firms in New Zealand. 
Kumar (2012) advocated that the shareholding by institutional investors and 
managers affect firm performance while the equity ownership by foreign 
and corporate shareholders do not influence firm performance However, 
there was no evidence in favour of endogeneity of ownership structure 
significantly. Huang, Lin and Huang (2011) revealed ownerships of state and 
institutions have a positive effect on corporate leverage in high-leveraged 
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companies but not in low-leveraged firms. Pindado and de La Torre (2011) 
in a study of Spanish companies, points out that capital structure is partly 
determined by the incentives and the goals of those who are in control 
of the firm because of managerial entrenchment and rent expropriation 
phenomena. Additionally, they found evidence of an interaction effect 
between managerial ownership and ownership concentration, in particular, 
the larger debt increments promoted by outside owners when managers 
are entrenched. In Indian companies, Ganguli and Agrawal (2009) show 
that there is negative relationship between performance and diffused 
shareholding for Indian companies. The empirical evidence showed that 
there is a dominance of concentrated holding pattern in Indian context and 
found positive relationship between firm performance and concentration 
of holding and vice versa. Lakshmi (2009) found a significant but negative 
relationship between the ownership structure (represented by promoter’s 
shareholding) and the capital structure. The firm specific variables like size, 
growth, profit, tangibility, and business risk were found to be statistically 
significant. Business risk and debt employed were positively related while 
Growth options and non-debt tax shields were statistically significant in 
explaining the cross sectional differences in the capital structure. Kaur and 
Gill (2009) observed that there is an insignificant shareholding of individuals 
and a fall in the proportion of outstanding shares held by banks, insurance 
companies, and corporate bodies from 2001-06. In addition, ownership 
concentration increased over a period and Indian promoters had the highest 
stake in 54% of all the cases while foreign promoters just held 12%.
In the Russian context, Poyry and Maury (2010) analysed the state 
controlled firms and found that firms with the state as controlling shareholder 
have significantly higher leverage than firms controlled by domestic private 
controlling shareholders other than oligarchs. The study showed that 
profitability is negatively related to leverage across all types of controlling 
owners, indicating pecking order theory. Al-Najjar and Taylor (2008) found 
that ownership structure has a strong effect on the capital structure choice of 
Jordanian firms. Jordanian firms institutional capital and ownership structure 
were determined jointly by assets tangibility, firm size, growth opportunities, 
and business risk are considered. Abor (2007) in their seminal contribution, 
found that Ghanaian listed firms pursue high debt policy with larger board 
size, higher percentage of non-executive directors, and CEO duality. The 
results also showed a negative relationship between the tenure of the CEO 
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and capital structure, suggesting that entrenched CEOs employ lower debt 
in order to reduce the performance pressures associated with high debt 
capital. A study by Selarka (2005) found interesting results that showed 
insider ownership in group firms in Indian corporates is much lower when 
the relation between firm value and insider ownership becomes positive. 
One of the implications of this finding is that the securities market signals 
the expropriation motives of stand-alone firms, which are relatively smaller 
and younger, until the insiders own such a stake where expropriation may 
cause huge wealth loss. The research also showed evidence of managerial 
entrenchment in private corporate bodies. Ang, Cole, and Lin (2000) 
revealed that agency costs are higher when an outsider manages the firm, 
agency costs vary inversely with the manager’s ownership share, external 
monitoring by banks may lower the agency costs, and that monitoring on 
managers expenditures on perquisites and other personal consumption 
relies on vigilance by third parties. Their findings were in line of Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) and Fama and Jensen (1983). Agrawal and Nagarajan 
(1990) in their study of equity based firms in India found that managerial 
control of voting rights and family relationships among senior managers are 
important factors in the decision to eliminate leverage. Results confirmed 
that top managers of all-equity firms with family involvement in corporate 
operations have greater control of corporate voting rights, than managers 
of all-equity firms without family involvement. Agarwal and Knoeber 
(1996) conducted a study on firm performance and mechanisms to control 
agency problems and found interdependence between the seven mechanisms 
namely shareholdings of insiders, institutions, and large block holders, use 
of outside directors, debt policy, the managerial labour market, and the 
market for corporate control in large firms. Shareholders greater insider 
ownership was positively related to performance, while more outsiders on 
the board, more debt financing, and greater corporate control activity were 
negatively related to performance. 
Eminent researchers have explored the relationship between capital 
structure, ownership structure, and firm value in emerging economies like 
India and developed economies (UK, US). However, a review of studies in 
the Indian context showed that most of the researchers have concentrated on 
the ownership structure (corporate governance) and its impact on firm value 
(Chadha & Sharma, 2015; Dawar, 2014; Banerjee & De, 2014; Jaisawal & 
Srivastava, 2013). Apart from a limited amount of empirical research by 
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Ganguli (2013) and Lakshmi (2009), there is hardly any empirical evidence 
that links the ownership structure directly with the capital structure of the 
companies. The present study attempts to fill this gap by examining the 
relationship between ownership structure and the capital structure in the 
automobile industry. Since the ownership structure of Indian automobile 
companies which are family owned is comparatively very different (Tawiah 
et al., 2014) from other companies globally, it would be interesting to 
investigate its relationship with capital structure and find if the Agency 
Theory exists in these firms.
DATA AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
Sources of Data
The information relating to the ownership patterns, capital structure, 
financial ratios and other variables was collected from the latest version 
of Prowess for Interactive Querying (Prowess IQ), Centre for Monitoring 
Indian Economy (CMIE). It is a powerful internet-based application 
for querying CMIE’s database on performances of listed and unlisted 
companies. Established in 1976, CMIE is a leading business information 
company, which provides financial performance time series data of Indian 
companies through paid subscription, and its database is updated on a daily 
basis. Annual Reports of individual companies was the principal source of 
this database. 
Period of the Study
The Auto Industry saw tremendous changes post liberalization and 
that too after policies like Auto policy 2002, the growth of the Automobile 
sector was persistent. Discontinuation of foreign exchange neutrality and 
approval of 100% Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) via automatic route were 
few of the impactful policy decisions which invited more foreign investors 
in India. Thus the ownership patterns also changed during this period. The 
period 2001-14 includes both pre and post financial distress (2008) period. 
Thus the relationship between capital structure and ownership structure 
was explored for 14 years from 2000-01 to 2013-14 which included all the 
major amendments of the Automobile Industry (Source: SIAM).
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Sample Selection
Sample selection consisted of listed Automobile companies on the 
Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE) from 2000-2001 to 2013-2014. The 
preliminary list of sample companies was around 44 companies. Firms 
having missing values in either the dependent variable or independent 
variables and inactive firms in terms of business operations throughout 
the period of the study were excluded. The firms were selected based on 
market capitalization, sales, and net profit and market share as per top BSE 
100 AUTO under Auto 2/3 wheelers, Auto LCVs and HCVS and Auto Cars 
and Jeeps.
Theoretical Framework
Promoters Shareholding was used as a proxy for  ownership structure 
to investigate its impact on capital structure. However, capital structure  is 
affected by  number of other factors, hence, the need for control variables 
to be included in the model. But these control variables  were treated in the 
same way as explanatory variables and discussed in detail. The details of 
the variables used in the study is presented in Table 2
Table 2: Description of the Variables
Variables Definition Measurement
Dependent/
Independent/
control
DE Debt Equity Ratio Debt/Total Equity is used as a proxy 
for capital structure
D
PSH Promoters Shareholding % of Promoters  to total shareholding 
was used as a proxy for ownership 
structure
I
ATR Assets turnover Ratio Net sales /average total assets C
UNI Uniqueness Selling and distribution expense as a 
percentage of net sales
C
Size Size Natural logarithm of total assets C
D=Dependent; I =Independent; C=Control
Objective: To investigate the relationship between the ownership 
structure and the capital structure of the Automobile Industry in India.
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Hypothesis
H0  There is no significant relationship between ownership structure and 
capital structure of the automobile industry as a whole in India.
For the dependent variable debt equity ratio the null hypothesis (sub 
hypothesis) mentioned in Table 3 was tested for each of the explanatory 
variables:
Table 3: Sub Hypothesis
H01 There is no significant relationship between promoters shareholding and 
debt equity ratio 
H02 There is no significant relationship between the assets turnover ratio and 
debt equity ratio 
H03 There is no significant relationship between the uniqueness and debt equity 
ratio
H04 There is no significant relationship between the size and debt equity ratio 
For analysing the impact of ownership structure on Capital 
structure (DE) following panel regression models have been developed:
	 DE	it	=	βo	+	β1	(PSH)	it +β2	(ATR)it	+	β3	(UNI)it	+	β4	(SIZE)	it	+	
εit      ________      
 Pooled Model (1) 
	 DE	it	=	βoi	+	β1	(PSH)	it +β2	(ATR)it	+	β3	(UNI)it	+	β4	(SIZE)	it	+	
µit   ________ 
	 Fixed	Effect	Model	(2)	
Where,
DE it = Debt equity ratio of firm i at time t.
PSH it = Promoters shareholding of firm i at time t.
ATR it = Assets Turnover Ratio of firm i at time t 
UNI it = Uniqueness of firm i at time t.
SIZE it = Size of firm i at time t.
βo = common y-intercept.
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βoi  = the y-intercept of firm i
β1 – β4 = coefficients of the concerned explanatory and control 
variables.
εit = error term of firm i at time t.
µit = the error term of firm i at time t.
Research Methodology
Panel data procedures were applied because the sample contained both 
cross section data and time series data. Taking the sample companies as the 
representative of the automobile industry, Panel Data regression was used 
across 10 leading companies for 14 years. These companies cover 92% of 
the market share (SIAM, 2015). The use of panel data increased the sample 
size considerably and is more appropriate to study the dynamics of change
(Gujarati, 2012). Panel data by blending inter individual differences and 
intra individual dynamics have advantages over cross sectional or time 
series data. Panel data usually contain more degrees of freedom and more 
sample variability than cross sectional data or time series. It controls the 
impact of omitted variables i.e. reduces omitted variable bias.
Methodology and Model Estimation 
Under the hypothesis that there are no groups or individual effects 
among the firms included in the sample, first estimated pooled OLS model 
was used. Since panel data contains observations on the same cross-sectional 
units over several time periods there might be cross-sectional effects on each 
firm or on a set of group of firms. Therefore, the Lagrange Multiplier test was 
applied to see which model is better Pooled/Ordinary Least square or Panel. 
Table 9.26, shows the results of the Lagrange multiplier test as significant 
(21.883/0.0000) at 5%, suggesting the suitability of panel models over the 
pooled model. Further panel data have cross section effects, either fixed or 
random. The Fixed Effect redundant Test was applied and the results of the 
Test were significant suggesting the use of the Fixed Effect Model (FEM). 
Descriptive Statistics, Correlation Matrix, and VIF values have also been 
presented for each of the variables. The data analysis was been done with 
the help of the statistical software E-Views and SPSS. 
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Descriptive Statistics
Table 4 provides a summary of the descriptive statistics of the 
dependent and independent variables. The maximum and minimum values 
and the standard deviations for each of the variable are also presented in 
Table 4. The mean debt equity ratio of the firms is 0.5581. This suggests 
that total debt appears to constitute more than half of the capital of the 
firms i.e. 55% of total assets are financed by debt capital and the rest 45% 
by other sources. The maximum value is 3.55 and the minimum value is 0.
The mean Promoters shareholding is 49.46, which shows almost 
50% of the shareholding in the Indian automobile firms constitutes of 
promoters shareholding. This means the remaining 50% is non -promoter’s 
shareholding. The minimum and maximum value shows that in the 
Automobile Industry minimum Promoters to total shareholding is 4.87% 
and while the maximum percentage is 76.69. The standard deviation is 13.81 
showing huge variations. Assets turnover ratio taken as sales to average total 
assets registers a mean value of 1.628. It has a maximum ratio of 3.48 and 
minimum 0.63. Mean of uniqueness given as a ratio of selling & distribution 
to % of net sales is 5.55. The maximum value is 12.17 and the minimum 
value is 0.56. Firm size determined as the natural logarithm of total assets 
has a mean of 9.95. Maximum value is 13.22 and minimum value is 5.25.
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics
DE PSH ATR UNI Size
Mean 0.558143 49.46521 1.628 5.557286 9.952804
Median 0.44 54.21 1.47 5.01 10.17399
Maximum 3.55 76.79 3.48 12.17 13.22551
Minimum 0 4.87 0.63 0.56 5.254365
Std. Dev. 0.517556 13.81409 0.637766 2.631846 1.883013
Sources: CMIE Prowess; statistical tool: E-Views
Correlation Analysis
Table 5 represents the correlation matrix between variables. Debt 
Equity ratio is negatively correlated with the Promoters shareholding but 
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is insignificant at the 5% level. Debt equity ratio is negatively correlated 
with Assets Turnover Ratio and significant at the 1% level. It is positively 
correlated with uniqueness and signicant at 5%. It is negatively correlated 
with size. Within the independent variables promoter’s shareholding is 
positively correlated with the Assets Turnover Ratio and significant at the 
1% level. PSH is negatively correlated with size and significant at the 1% 
level and positively correlated with uniqueness. Assets turnover ratio and 
size are negatively correlated and significant at the 1% level.
Table 5: Correlation Matrix
DE PSH ATR UNI SIZE
DE Pearson Correlation 1
Sig. (2-tailed) -
PSH Pearson Correlation -.090 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .288 -
ATR
Pearson Correlation -.314** .449** 1
Sig. (2-tailed) (.000) (.000) -
UNI Pearson Correlation .179
* .048 -.008 1
Sig. (2-tailed) (.034) .570 .925 -
SIZE Pearson Correlation -.071 -.384
** -.363** .122 1
Sig. (2-tailed) .407 (.000) (.000) .152 -
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*.   Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
P values are in parentheses
Sources: CMIE Prowess; statistical tool: E-Views
Empirical Results and Discussion
Results of fixed effect redundant test are reported in Table 7 and the 
χ2 (df 9) value (5.30/0.0000) indicates that the null hypothesis of no cross-
section fixed effect is rejected and supports panel data fixed effect model 
over the pooled model. In addition, the value of R2 for the fixed effects 
estimation model (43%) is higher than Pooled OLS Model (21%), indicating 
the existence of the omitted variables. However, to have a comparative 
analysis, regression results of both Pooled and Fixed Effect Model 1 and 2 
are presented in Tables 6 and 7.
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Table 6: Regression Results – Pooled Model 
[Dependent Variable: Debt Equity Ratio]
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob VIF
P R O M O T E R S 
SHAREHOLDING
-0.00135 0.00186 -0.7247 0.46990 1.360
ASSETS TURNOVER 
RATIO
-0.17914 0.039732 -4.50872 0.00000 1.324
UNIQUENESS 0.028284 0.008477 3.336423 0.00110 1.026
SIZE -0.03826 0.013168 -2.90564 0.00430 1.267
C 0.980886 0.190014 5.162166 0.00000
Total panel (balanced) 
observations
140
Cross-sections included 10
Periods included 14
R-squared 0.213052
Adjusted R-squared 0.189735
F-statistic 9.137214
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000001
Durbin-Watson stat 1.762395
Sources: CMIE Prowess; statistical tool: E-Views
Table 7 reveals the results of the Fixed Effect Model 2, and it has 
been found that there is a significant relationship between Promoters 
shareholding and debt equity ratio as the p value of 0.0158 < 0.05. Thus, the 
null hypothesis is rejected that there is no significant relationship between 
ownership structure and capital structure of the Automobile Industry. 
Ownership structure has a positive relationship with capital structure 
showing its direct impact on the capital structure of the Indian automobile 
industry and emphasizes the fact of usage of debt to mitigate agency costs 
in the automobile firms. These results are consistent with previous studies 
(Agarwal & Knoeber, 1996; Ganguli, 2013; Abor, 2007; King & Santor, 
2008; Alipour, 2015; Owolabi & Inyang, 2013). Figure 1 depicts the agency 
cost theory model in detail with the positive and negative relationship 
outcomes between capital and ownership structure.
According to the fixed panel data regression results in Table 7, 
Promoters Shareholding and Assets Turnover Ratio are significant in 
determining the capital structure of the automobile industry as a whole. 
Uniqueness and size are not significant at the 5% level. R2 value shows 
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the combined effect of the model. It reveals that capital structure has 42% 
variation due to the explanatory variables used in the model. 
Additionally F-statistics value accept the fitness of the model. The 
Durbin Watson test result is within the acceptable range of 1-3 and suggests 
there is no auto correlation problem. The VIF value of all the variables are 
under the acceptable limit. (V<10) showing no serial multi collinearity 
problem.
Table 7: Regression Results – Fixed Effect Model 
[Dependent Variable: Debt Equity Ratio]
Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. VIF
PROMOTERS 
SHAREHOLDING 0.006217 0.002541 2.446784 0.0158 1.360
ASSETS TURNOVER 
RATIO -0.16879 0.046739 -3.6114 0.0004 1.324
UNIQUENESS 0.02257 0.01292 1.74689 0.0831 1.026
SIZE -0.02635 0.030453 -0.86527 0.3885 1.267
C 0.503076 0.352619 1.426686 0.1561
Total panel (balanced) 
observations 140
Cross-sections included 10
Periods included                                 14
R-squared 0.429125
Adjusted 
R-squared 0.370225
F-statistic 7.285664
Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000
Durbin-Watson stat 1.847267
LaGrange Multiplier test/ 
prob 21.883/0.0000
Redundant Fixed Effects
Tests Statistic/prob
Cross-section F                             5.30/0.0000
Cross section χ2 (df 9) 44.94/0.000
Sources: CMIE Prowess; statistical tool: E-Views
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Control Varibles: Assets Turnover Ratio shows a negative relationship 
with capital structure (Reddy & Locke, 2014), thus emphasizing the fact 
that efficient utilization of assets results into enhanced profitability, which 
may lead to low requirement of external debt. Uniqueness has a positive 
relationship in the Automobile Industry as a whole thus supporting the fact 
that firms with unique products may require more finance and therefore they 
would opt for debt in market. These results are surprising as previous studies 
showed a negative relationship (Chaddha & Sharma, 2014; Harris & Raviv, 
1991; Titman & Wessels, 1988; Majumdar & Chibber, 1999; Bhaduri, 2002; 
Purohit & Khanna, 2012). Size has a significant but a negative relationship 
with capital structure which signals postulates of the Pecking Order Theory 
consistent with the results of previous studies (Chadha & Sharma, 2015; 
Purohit & Khanna, 2012; Alipour et al., 2015)
CONCLUSIONS
A vast literature has investigated the relationship between capital structure 
and performance and between ownership structure and firm performance. 
While most of these studies explore the relationship in the developed 
countries, little is empirically known about such implications in emerging 
economies such as India. Thus deviating from the existing research, this 
study investigated the relationship between capital structure and ownership 
structure from 2001-2014 in the Indian automobile industry.
The empirical results clearly reveal that ownership structure had a 
significant impact on the capital structure of the automobile industry as a 
whole. The empirical results indicate that after controlling variables such as 
ATR, uniqueness, and size ownership structure has a positive relationship 
with capital structure of the automobile industry in India.          
  
A positive relationship shows postulates of agency costs. Two 
important conclusions can be derived from this relationship. In order to 
restrain the managers from using free cash flows in negative projects, the 
promoters of the automobile firms opt for debt. Taking debt will not only 
result in the tax shield benefits but will also compel   managers to increase 
the profitability thereby increasing the firm value and decrease the activities 
of manager’s engagement for personal perquisites. External monitoring from 
17
Agency Theory, Ownership Structure and Capital Structure
the debtholders puts a soft pressure on managers to perform well as debt 
brings in fixed financial obligations which will enforce the managers to take 
up only profitable projects. Positive relationship between capital structure 
and ownership structure also indicates the Signalling Theory (Ross, 1977). 
According to Ross, debt gains investors’ confidence in the company. It gives 
a signal to the markets that the firm is expecting positive cash flows in near 
future, as the principal and interest expenses on debt are a fixed contractual 
compulsion that a firm has to pay from its cash flows. Investors know that 
only firms with good prospects can afford to take on debt, they recognise 
debt issuance as a good news and so bid up the firms shares. 
The existence of the Agency Theory signals the investors about the 
managers-shareholders as well as shareholders and debtholders relationship 
and its impact on company’s debt taking capacity. As the ownership structure 
(promoter’s shareholding) has a significant impact on the capital structure 
of the automobile industry, investors can see the pattern of promoter’s 
shareholding viz. Indian promoters holding, foreign promoters holding 
and persons acting in concert and then make the investment decisions 
accordingly. Also further if the ownership structure and capital structure can 
be studied for the whole manufacturing industry, it may give more concrete 
reasons of existence of agency theory in Indian firms.
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